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1. Hutter, Drajiing E'!!orceable Employee Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Co'!fiden-
tial Business I'!!ormation: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REV. 311, 
312 n.9 (1981). See 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394, at 89 (1962) (discussing en-
forcement of restrictive promises in employment contracts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 188(2) (1979) (defining promises imposing restraints ancillary to valid transactions or 
relationships). A covenant not to compete may be ancillary to a sale of a business or an employ-
ment or partnership relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(2) (1979). 
When th~ sale of goodwill is part of a business transaction, the covenant "engages [the seller] not 
to act so'as unreasonably to diminish the value of what he has sold." The covenant is thus an 
important factor in the purchase price. Courts have traditionally been more willing to uphold the 
validity of covenants in cases involving business transactions and sales of goodwill than in cases 
involving employment relationships. Id. 
This Article addresses covenants only in the context of agency relationships and not as they 
relate to sales of businesses. Agency relationships occur in both employment and partnership 
settings. The factors relevant to covenants not to compete in partnerShips, especially the fiduciary 
duty of partners to the partnership and their fellow partners, are similar to those in the general 
employment context. The major relevant difference between partnership and employment rela-
tionships is that a partner is more likely to possess equal bargaining power to the partnership 
employer, whereas a general employee is not likely to have as much power as the employer. This 
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Because of the increasing emphasis in the American economy on tech-
nically skilled employees and service oriented businesses, the covenant 
not to compete has become a standard addition to employment con-
tracts.2 Moreover, the number of litigated and reported cases may rep-
resent only a small percentage of the actual number of employment 
restrictions currently in force.3 Regardless of their validity and en-
forceability, covenants not to compete chill the free movement of em-
ployees and eliminate competition among actual and potential 
employers.4 Because of both these effects and the existence of many 
unchallenged covenants of questionable validity, the judicial system 
must clearly define the legal parameters of the enforceability of such 
covenants. 
Traditionally, scholars in this area have generally been content to 
organize the voluminous case law available and describe the patterns of 
legal analysis contained therein.s This Article instead suggests a unify-
ing theory for consistently resolving all litigation of covenants not to 
compete. This theory focuses on the employer's protectable interest 
and limits postassociational restraints to the extent of this interest. This 
Article proposes that the appropriate sources of both the definition of 
protectable interest and the limitation on injunctive relief are those 
agency and unfair competition doctrines that justify postassociational 
restraints in the absence of contractual restrictions. Under this ap-
proach, the tenns of any agreement will generally be viewed as super-
fluous. This Article concludes that the covenant not to compete and 
related contract law rules should, in most cases, be given no effect. 
Article includes both employment and partnership relationships when using agency and employ-
ment terminology, except as otherwise indicated. 
2. See S. LIEBERSTEIN, WHO OWNS WHAT Is IN YOUR HEAO? 164-70 (1979) (advising use 
of coutractual clauses to protect employer secrets and inventions); [Milgram on Trade Secrets) 12 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (MB) § 3.02, at 3-8 (1983) (of 86 corporations surveyed in 1965, 83 
used contracts to protect trade secrets; it is anticipated a current survey would find a higher per-
centage of such coutracts) [hereinafter cited as MILGRlM); Hutter, supra note I, at 311-12 (cove-
nants prohibiting employees from competing with former employers quite prevalent). 
3. Sullivan, ReVisiting the "Neglected Stepchild'~' Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Re-
straints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 620, 622-23. 
4. See Blake, Employee Agreements Nollo Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682-83 (1960) 
(intimidation imposed by covenants, regardless of enforceability, restricts employee mobility). 
5. See, e.g., Stein, Employee Non-Competition Restrictions by Contract and Otherwise, 1983 
A.B.A. DIV. OF PROF. Eouc. (compiling judicial treatment of non-competition clauses in the em-
ployment context); Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 756-66 (1982) (providing, in appendix format, numerous decisions 
upholding or invalidating covenants not to compete); Annot., 61 A.L.R30 397 (1975) (collecting 
cases determining the enforceability of covenants with unreasonable restrictions on competition). 
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I. AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND POSTASSOCIATIONAL 
RESTRAINTS 
533 
The fiduciary nature of the agency relationship mandates that an 
agent not use certain information to the principal's detriment either 
during the relationship or after its termination. During the agency re-
lationship, the agent has "a duty not to compete with the principal con-
cerning the subject matter of his agency."6 The agent does not violate 
this duty merely by making arrangements to compete with the principal 
in the future,7 but does violate this duty through acts of disloyalty or 
actual or direct competition.s An agent can therefore purchase a rival 
business prior to leaving the principal's employ9 but cannot, while still 
employed, solicit business from the principal's customerslO or en-
courage other employees to either terminate relations with the em-
ployer or resign en masse to join a new enterprise. l1 Courts may award 
damages or impose postassociational restraints to remedy an agent's 
pretermination conduct.12 Courts frequently characterize the cause of 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1957). 
7. E.g., Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39-40, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978). Cf. 
United Bd. & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 61 N.J. Super. 340, 347, 160 A.2d 660, 664 (App. Div. 
1960) (injunction against former employee limited to prevent him from dealing with customers to 
whom he sold while actually working for the employer). 
8. See, e.g., Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60, 69,248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 130 (App. Div. 1964) 
(cmployee who, during period of employment, carries out conspiracy to compete with employer 
violates duty ofloyalty); Lowndes Prod., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 335, 191 S.E.2d 761, 768 
(1972) (employee violated duty by appropriating employer's "carefully developed business rela-
tiouship" while still in his employ); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 co=ent 
e (1957) (an agent may not "solicit customers for ... rival business before the end of his employ-
ment nor can he properly do other similar acts in direct competition with the employer's 
business"). 
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 co=ent e (1957). 
10. See, e.g., Arnold's Ice Cream Co. v. Carlson, 330 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(employee violated responsibility to employer by soliciting employer's customers before 
resigning). 
11. See, e.g., Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327,347-48,49 Cal. Rptr. 825, 840, 
411 P.2d 921, 936 (1966) (corporate president's efforts to obtain key employees for its competitor 
constituted a breach of fiduciary duties); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 188-89, 117 
N.E.2d 237,245 (1954) (employees violated fiduciary duty to employer by diverting over half of 
employer's personnel into employees' newly formed corporation). 
12. E.g., McLean v. Hubbard, 24 Misc. 2d 92, 96-97, 194 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648-50 (Sup. Ct. 
1959), ajJ'd 208 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1960) (injunction granted where former manager of telephone serv-
ice set up own answering service using knowledge obtained through such employment); United 
Bd. & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 61 N.J. Super. 340, 347, 160 A.2d 660, 664 (App. Div. 1960) 
(injunction against former employee limited to prevent him from dealing with customers to whom 
he sold while actually working for the employer); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 188-
89, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245 (1954) (damages appropriate where employees violated fiduciary duty to 
cmployer by diverting over half of employer's personnel into employees' newly formed 
corporation). 
534 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [V01. 57:531 
action as arising from a breach of the agent's duty of loyalty rather 
than from the principal's interest in information. 13 
After the agency terminates, the agent's fiduciary obligations be-
come less stringent and the agent is free to compete with the former 
principal. 14 Even if the agent has not violated any pretermination du-
ties, however, a court may still enjoin or impose damages for the 
agent's .posttermination use of certain information obtained during the 
agency relationship.15 In these cases, courts generally justify such ac-
tion either by characterizing the protected information as the exclusive 
property of the principal,16 or by deriving the principal's interest in the 
protected information from the confidential nature of the agency rela-
tionship itself.17 The best rationale incorporates elements of both justi-
fications. The principal has a legitimate interest in freely 
communicating information to agents without fearing they will later 
use the information to the principal's detriment. 18 In assessing the pro-
priety of any postassociational restraint, a court must balance the prin-
cipal's interest in the information against the agent's acknowledged 
rights to terminate the relationship, compete with the former principal, 
and preserve personal market SkillS.19 In this balancing, a court must 
13. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. Because the duty of loyalty, rather than the 
principal's protectable information, is the basis of granting relief to plaintiff-employers in 
pretermination cases, posttermination restraints arising from a breach of pretermination duty are 
not the focus of this Article. 
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a) (1957) (unless otherwise agreed, the 
agent may compete with a former principal). But see id. § 396(b)-(d) (limiting the no duty rule). 
15. Id. § 396(b)-(d). 
16. See, e.g., By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329 
P.2d 147, 151 (1958) (characterizing confidential information as property of the employer which is 
held in trust by the employee); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 1234 Ind. 398, 404, 127 N.E.2d 
235, 240 (1955) (employer has property rights in confidential information). Cf. MILGRIM, supra 
note 2, § 1.01, at 1-2 (courts generally hold that trade secrets are property). 
17. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Power Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (confi-
dential relationship requires nondisclosure of information acquired through that relationship, re-
gardless of whether the information is "property"); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375-76 
(7th Cir. 1953) (information protected because it is secret); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. 
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (duty not to 
disclose trade secrets derived from confidential relationship). Courts have also found "an implied 
contract" not to disclose confidential infonnation obtained in the course of a confidential relation-
ship. E.g., Westervelt v. Nat'l Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 678·79, 57 N.E. 552, 554 (1900). 
18. See Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case 
Law, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. I, 7·9 (1978) (enumerating various approaches courts use to con· 
clude that principal has legitimate interest in trade secrets). One can view this information, which 
provides the agent with special skill or knowledge, as an asset of the principal. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 comment b (1957) (principal's information is often a unique asset of 
great value). 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 comment b (1957). 
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distinguish between the protectable information that legitimately be-
longs to the principal and the knowledge, personality traits, and market 
skills that the agent validly possesses.2° 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency delineates the ambit of each 
party's interest by focusing upon the concepts of trade secrets and con-
fidential information.21 If the principal invested energy and effort in 
developing the information, and treated the information as secret or 
revealed it confidentially to the agent, then the principal has a protect-
able interest in the information.22 The former agent may not use this 
information or disclose it to third parties.23 The agent may continue to 
use personal skills, including those acquired or honed during the course 
of the agency, as well as generally known or available information re-
garding the business.24 
20. See, e.g., Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc., 85 Ill. App. 2d 350, 357-58, 228 N.E.2d 742, 746 
(1967) (agent need not ignore his own general talent and friendships when competing with former 
employer so long as no special confidence is violated); Lamb v. Quality Inspection Serv., Inc., 398 
So. 2d 643, 648 (La. Ct. App. 1981) ("What is entitled to protection is knowledge confidentially 
gained, but an employer cannot prevent his employee from using the skill or intelligence acquired 
through experience received in the course of the employment"); Hallmark Personnel of Texas, Inc. 
v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933,936 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) (employee may use his inventive powers but 
not his principal's trade secret). 
21. The agent: 
(b) has a duty to the principal not to use or to disclose to third persons, on his own 
account or on acconnt of others. in competition with the principal or to his injury, trade 
secrets. written lists of names, or other similar confidential matters given to him only for 
the principal's use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty. The agent is entitled to 
use general information concerning the method of business of the principal and the 
names of the customers retained in his memory, ifnot acquired in violation of his duty as 
agent; 
(c) has a duty to account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other 
confidential information, whether or not in competition with the principal; [and] 
(d) has a duty to the principal not to take advantage of a still subsisting confidential 
relation created during the prior agency relation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b)-(d) (1957). 
22. Id. § 396(b). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. See also id. § 396 comments b, g. Some courts have found no protectable interest of 
the principal when the information was retained in the agent's memory. See, e.g., Leo Silfen, Inc. 
v. Cream. 29 N.Y.2d 387, 389-95, 278 N.E.2d 636, 637-41, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425-31 (1972) (al-
lowing former employee to use customer list because he did not compile it by "a physical taking or 
studied copying"). The best approach focuses on the secrecy of the information or the confidenti-
ality of the attendant circumstances: "The mere fact that an ex-employee has a good memory and 
needs no tangible records seems to be a slender reed upon which to hang a finding of nonliabiI-
ity." 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:5 (1973). Memorized infor-
mation can therefore still be subject to a postassociational restraint. See, e.g., Adolph Gottscho, 
Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 35 NJ. Super. 333,passim, 114 A.2d 19,passim (Ch. Div. 1954) 
(granting injunction against former employee who knew machine design well enough to recreate it 
for competitor without actual blueprints or copies), o/f'd, 18 N.J. 467. 114 A.2d 438 (1955). See 
also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra (concluding that it is immaterial whether information is written or 
memorized). 
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The precise definition of a trade secret and the degree of secrecy or 
confidentiality sufficient to support a postassociational restraint is a 
matter of state law25 and thus varies with the particular jurisdiction. 
The Restatement of Torts26 describes the factors which determine 
whether an employer has a trade secret: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to 
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information 
to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money 
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or diffi-
culty with which the information could be properly acquired or du-
plicated by others.27 
The concept of a trade secret is therefore not limited to any particular 
subject matter or type of inf<;>rmation.28 Trade secrets can range from 
complex, high technology information29 to simple lists of the principal's 
customers.30 
25. E.g., Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 608 F.2d 87, 95 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 
(1980). See MILGRIM, supra note 2, § 2.01, at 2-2.1 to -12 (compiling various definitions of "trade 
secret"). 
26. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted the sections appearing in the 
Restatement of Torts pertaining to "liability for harm caused by unfair trade practices." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, division 9 introductory note, at 1 (1977). In the beHefthat this area of 
law is of historical interest only, the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated that it is 
"no more dependent upon Tort law than it is on many other general fields of the law and upon 
broad statutory developments, particularly at the federal level." Id. Courts, however, continue to 
rely on the Restatement of Torts in this area. See, e.g., eases cited i'!fra note 31. 
Id. 
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 co=ent b (1939). 
28. The Restatement defines a trade secret as follows: 
A trade secret may consist of any fonnula, pattern, device or compilation of infonnation 
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical 
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a 
machine or other device, or a list of customers. It differs from other secret information in 
a business. . . in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the 
conduct of the business. . . . A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in 
the operation of the business. 
29. See., e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 644-46, 358 N.E.2d 
804,805-06 (1976) (proprietary information learned during development of high speed data acqui-
sition module is trade secret); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 499, 192 
N.E.2d 99, 104 (1963) (knowledge of the manufacture of space suits is trade secret). 
30. E.g., Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Kuberski, 108 Mich. App. 642, 650-52, 311 N.W.2d 122, 
126-27 (1981). Customer Hsts are not protected if the information can be compiled from sources 
readily available to those in the industry. 
The general rule is that, where the customers are readily ascertainable outside the 
employer's business as prospective users or consumers ofthe employer's services or prod-
ucts, trade secret protection will not attach and courts will not enjoin the former em-
ployee from soliciting his previous employer's customers. Customer Hsts are protected, 
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The core inquiry in determining whether certain information is 
protectable is the principal's relation to the information-that is, the 
degree to which the principal created the information or treated it as a 
valuable, nonpublic asset.31 Protectable information may include infor-
mation that is shrouded by a cloak of confidentiality due to the nature 
of the agency relationship but that does not technically qualify as a 
trade secret.32 In these cases, the agent has usually acquired the infor-
mation in the course of a confidential relationship or through improper 
means.33 In either circumstance the principal has a reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality.34 
Jurisdictional differences in the definitions of trade secrets and 
confidential information are beyond the scope of this Article. It is suffi-
cient to state here that the principal's protectable interest is defined by 
the applicable state's concept of secrecy and confidentiality. If no pro-
tectable interest exists, then the principal has no right to prohibit the 
former agent from using the information, and, consequently, no post-
on the other hand, where the customers are not known in the trade or are discoverable 
only by extraordinary efforts or where an employee appropriates the list by copying or 
studied memory. 
AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F. Supp. 747, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (citation omitted). 
31. See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1178-79 (N.D. Ind. 
1981) (information qualifies as a trade secret or confidential information when employer intended 
to keep information secret and incurred cost in gaining information); Holiday Food Co. v. Mun-
roe, 37 Conn. Supp. 546, 550-51, 426 A.2d 814,816-17 (Super. Ct. 1981) (applying Restatement of 
Torts' six factors to determine whether customer list is a trade secret); Lamb v. Quality Inspection 
Serv., Inc., 398 So. 2d 643,645 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (test for trade secrecy includes whether infor-
mation is valuable and secret). 
32. See, e.g., Leo Silfen, Ine. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 391, 278 N.E.2d 636, 639, 328 
N.Y.S.2d 423, 427 (1972) (had there been a physical taking of a customer list it might not have 
been a violation of a trade secret but an "egregious breach of trust and confidence"); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1957) (prohibiting agent's use of trade secrets or 
"other similar confidential matters"). 
33. See Hutter, supra note 18, at 9 (trade secret law prohibits only acquisition of confidential 
information by unfair means). 
34. Compare AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F. Supp. 747, 754 (E.D. N.Y. 
1977) (lists of prospective customers rather than actual customers do not receive trade secret pro-
tection) with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (information which is not a trade 
secret may be protected if acquired in a confidential relationship or through improper means). 
Confidential information is not clearly defined by the courts or commentators. As notcd in the 
Restatement of Torts, confidential information includes more than just trade secrets. Confidential 
information should include the items of knowledge necessary to make the particular relationship 
economically efficient-information which the principal must disclose to the agent to obtain the 
full value of the relationship and which should not, in fairness, be subsequently employed against 
the principal by competitors. This rationale supports a principal's protectable interest in confiden-
tial information in the covenant context: "Arguably the employer does not get the full value of 
the employment contract if he cannot confidently give the employee access to confidential infor-
mation needed for most efficient performance of his job." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 188 comment b (1979). See i'!fra text accompanying notes 53-54, 75. 
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associational restraint will be available.3s 
If a protectable interest does exist, courts have a variety of reme-
dies to limit the agent's activities and ensure the requisite protection. A 
court may order the offending agent to pay damages based on the 
agent's misuse of the principa1's asset.36 The court may also enjoin the 
agent from soliciting certain customers or employees of the principal or 
restrain the agent from using or disclosing the principa1's protected in-
formation.37 Courts are reluctant, however, to impose an occupational 
ban upon a former agent,38 and reserve this drastic remedy for those 
cases in which the agent's subsequent employment involves an inevita-
ble or substantial risk of disclosure or appropriation of the principa1's 
information.39 In imposing a ban on a type of subsequent employment, 
the court may condition the order upon the principa1's payment of a 
salary to the agent for the effective period of the ban.40 Thus, in the 
absence of co:ntractual agreement, courts may order damages for past 
misuse or issue postassociational restraints ranging from narrow re-
strictions upon the use of protected information to bans on practicing 
an occupation inextricably related to the use of such information. 
Agency principles dictate that, if the principa1's interest warrants 
the imposition of a restraint on the former agent's activities, the dura-
tion of the restriction must also be limited by the nature of the pro-
tected information.41 The length of an injunction is therefore normally 
35. E.g., Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 394-96, 278 N.E.2d 636, 640-42, 328 
N.Y.S.2d 423,429-31 (1972); Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 445, 465-
68, 147 N.W.2d 529, 539-41 (1967). 
36. The actual standard for computation of damages varies greatly from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. See Annot., II A.L.R.4TH 4-12 (1982) (presenting various measures of damages for mis-
appropriation of trade secrets). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
37. E.g., AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F. Supp. 747, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); 
United Bd. & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 61 N.J. Super. 340, 346-47, 160 A.2d 660, 663-64 (App. 
Div.1960). 
38. See, e.g., E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (8th Cir. 1969) 
(lower court order too broad because it restrained defendants beyond unlawful competition); 
Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (W. Va. 1979) (restraint that employee shall "not en-
gage, either directly or indirectly, in any business or enterprise, the nature of which is competitive 
to the company's business" is too broad). 
39. See B.F. Goodrieh Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500-01, 192 N.E.2d 99, lOS 
(1963) (former employee enjoined from working for competitor because risk of disclosure 
threatened "irreparable injury" to former employer). 
40. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829, 836-37 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (en-
joining former employee for one year). 
41. See, e.g., Henry Hope X-Ray Prod., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("The limitation to confidential information contains the implicit temporal limitation 
that information may be disclosed when it ceases to be confidential"); Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 
497,499 (5th Cir. 1966) (injunction to run for time "necessary to remove the competitive advan-
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determined by the period of time that the information is expected to 
remain useful, secret, or confidentia1.42 The proscribed period is fre-
quently limited to the time it would take an analogous reasonable agent 
to discover the protected information independently.43 Because the 
scope of a principal's protectable interest depends on secrecy and confi-
dentiality,44 the extent of the restraint imposed in the noncontractual 
cases is coextensive with the principal's protectable interest. 
Agency law properly accommodates the principal's interest in pro-
tecting valuable information and the agent's right to pursue a chosen 
occupation. Agency rules preventing the misuse of protectable infor-
mation rarely require or justify imposing an occupational ban on the 
agent. By contrast, application of contract principles and specific terms 
of covenants not to compete often results in overprotection of the prin-
cipal's interest at the expense of the agent's right to practice a trade. 
The next section analyzes current judicial treatment of covenants not to 
compete. 
II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 
A. THE CURRENT ApPROACH 
When a party to a contract seeks to have a court either enforce or 
declare invalid a contractual restriction on an agent's postemployment 
activities, courts have generally applied the rules of contract law in-
dependent of and oblivious to the noncontractual agency precepts.45 
The legality of any covenant not to compete is initially suspect as a 
restraint of trade.46 Courts-and many legislatures47--disfavor re-
tage gained through the illegally used trade secrets"); Plant Indus., Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 
636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (ex-employer's trade secret could legitimately be duplicated within 18 
months; injunction against use to run for that reasonable time period). See generally Hutter, supra 
note 2, at 332-35 (describing reasonable time restraints). 
42. ld. 
43. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 225 F. Supp. 
645,654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (limiting injunction until the information comes into defendant's pos-
session legitimately); Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc., 85 Ill. App. 2d 350, 356, 228 N.E.2d 742, 745 
(1967) (proper time frame of injunction is period required to duplicate process by lawful means); 
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 648, 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (1976) (em-
ployer's trade secrets entitled to be "protected at least until others in the trade are likely, through 
legitimate business procedures, to have become aware of these secrets"). 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
45. Noncontractual postassociational restraints are a relatively recent legal development, 
whereas covenants not to compete have been litigated since the early period of English common 
law. For a discussion of the early English cases, see Blake, supra note 4, at 629-37. 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1979) (promises that limit competi-
tion or restrict promisor's exercise of gainful occupation are restraints of trade). 
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straints of trade and, consequently, courts tend to construe covenants 
not to compete against the principal seeking its enforcement.48 
Aside from the traditional distaste with which courts view agree-
ments restraining trade, modem courts recognize the inherent tension 
raised by covenants not to compete. On the one hand, courts are aware 
these restrictions place a heavy burden upon the ability of agents to 
pursue their careers and practice their SkillS.49 Public policy favoring 
agent mobility and free competition is evident in the near-unanimous 
judicial acknowledgement of the covenant's disfavored status as a re-
straint of trade.so Courts also perceive the covenant as inherently un-
fair because the principal's bargaining power is usually superior to the 
agent's.S1 This negotiating imbalance enhances the likelihood that the 
47. Certain states regulate the validity of covenants not to compete by statute. Some juris. 
dictions declare them invalid pursuant to a general state antitrust statute. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 75·2 (1981). Others specifically declare unreasonable covenants not to compete invalid. E.g., 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (West 1964); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465(West 1974). A final group 
specifically declares covenants illegal, but with some exceptions-usually for covenants ancillary 
to a sale of business or the dissolution ofa partnership. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600· 
16602 (West 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28·2·703 
to ·705 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9·08·06 (1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217·219 (1966); OR. 
REv. STAT. § 653.295 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53·9·8 to ·11 (1980). Typical excep· 
tions are as follows: 
(b) One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer and one who 
is employed as an agent, servant or employee may agree with his employer to refrain 
from carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old customers of 
such employer within a specified county, city or part thereof so long as the buycr, or any 
person deriving title to the good will from him, or employer carries on a like business 
therein. 
(c) Upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership, partners may agree 
that none of them will carry on a similar business within the same county, city or town, 
or within a specified part thereof, where the partnership busincss has been 
transacted. . . • 
ALA. CqDE § 8·1·1 (1975). 
48. See, e.g., Josten's, Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 297· 99 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (refusing to 
enforce covenant not to compete because employer could not prove its enforcement necessary to 
avoid irreparable injury). 
49. See Van Prod. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 261, 213 A.2d 
769, 776 (1965) (noting other courts recognize that denying employee use of his wealth of experi· 
ence would "wipe out his means of livelihood"). 
50. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. In a well·known opinion, a court noted 
that a restrictive covenant, "[b]eing a contract in restraint of trade!,] ... is presumptively void." 
Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1952). 
See also Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245,247,246 N.Y.S.2d 
600, 604 (1963) (strong policy considerations "against sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood"). 
The co=on law policy against restraints of trade has been described as "one of its oldest and 
best established." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS division 8 introductory note, topic 2 
(1979). 
51. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 co=ent g (1979) (courts scrutinize 
these restraints "with particular care because they are often the product of unequal bargaining 
power"). 
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covenant will restrict the agent's mobility to an extent far greater than 
any legitimate need of the principal. The agent, eager for the job op-
portunity, is not likely to seriously consider the potentially devastating 
impact of such a covenant on a career. 52 On the other hand, courts are 
sympathetic to the principal's need to protect trade secrets, confidential 
information, and goodwill. 53 The cases consequently recognize that the 
principal has a legitimate interest in protecting the economic efficiency 
of business relationships. Economic policy dictates that the principal be 
free to communicate information to employees without fearing future 
adverse use of such information by a departed employee.54 
Balancing these competing policies has led modem courts to scru-
tinize covenants not to compete by stating, first, that any such covenant, 
ancillary to an agency relationship, is unenforceable unless it protects 
some legitimate interest of the principaP5 Thus, the heart of the con-
tract analysis of the restraint, similar to that of the agency analysis, lies 
in the definition of the principal's protectable interests. In the covenant 
cases, such interests encompass the agent's possession of trade secrets56 
or some other form of confidential information.57 In addition, when 
the agent has had significant customer contact58 or possesses skills that 
are considered extraordinary or unique in the market, courts recognize 
52. Id. 
53. See i'!fra note 55; see also Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Re-
search Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1I02, 11I0 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (policy underlying trade secrecy law 
considers need for useful knowledge to be discovered and protection of discoverer to encourage 
inventiveness); Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 
1970) (according trade secret status to fruits of research in form of charts, graphs, and tables for 
daily use), modtfted, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971). 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comments b, c, g (1979); see MILGRIM, 
supra note 2, § 5.02[21, at 5-15 (justifying employer's property right in trade secrets as both en-
couraging development of new technology and creating job opportunities and employment 
stability). 
55. E.g., American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403, 420 N.E.2d 363,367,438 
N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a) (1979) 
(restraints are unreasonable if greater than needed to protect promised legitimate interest); Blake, 
supra note 4, at 649 (restraints are reasonable only if no greater than necessary to protect em-
ployer's legitimate interest). 
56. E.g., Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
57. E.g., Gorman Publishing Co. v. Stillman, 516 F. Supp. 98, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Struc-
tural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 
(E.D. Mich. 1975); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 779-80, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485-86 
(1974); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 306-08, 553 N.E.2d 590, 593-94, 
386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976); if. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g 
(1979) (employer's interest in confidential trade information). 
58. E.g., North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 275 Or. 359, 364-66, 551 P.2d 431, 434-35 (1976); 
Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 593-94,351 A.2d 250, 253-54 (1976); Hospital Consultants, 
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an interest sufficient to support a restraint.59 
If the court finds that the principal has a protectabIe interest,60 it 
then examines the reasonableness of the restraint in light of the attend-
ant circumstances.61 Originating in the English common law treatment 
of the validity of covenants not to compete,62 the modem formulation 
of the reasonableness standard is analogous to the "rule of reason" tra-
ditionally applied in a restraint of trade inquiry under section one of 
the Sherman Antitrust ACt.63 In analyzing the reasonableness of cove-
nants not to compete, courts look to the geographic scope of the agree-
ment,64 the length oftime the restraint is to continue,65 and the types of 
Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See generally Blake, supra note 4, at 
653-67 (discussing employer's protectable interest in employee's contact with clientele). 
59. E.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 696 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga 
County 1952). Determining whether an agent is unique theoretically docs not depend on the 
excellence of his work, his competence, or his expertise but rather focuses on the possibility of 
replacing the agent or the irreparable harm that the principal would suffer upon losing the agent's 
services. Hutter, supra note I, at 327. E.g., Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 
1308, 1313 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally Kniffin, Employee Noncompelilion Covenanls: Tile Perils 
of Peiforming Unique Services, IO RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 25, 36-52 (1978) (discussing factors that 
comprise employee uniqueness). 
60. Because the concept of an employer's protectable interest has been inconsistently de-
fined, some courts have concluded too rapidly that the mere presence of a covenant not to compete 
imbues the principal with a protectable interest. See, e.g., Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 
F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976) (covenants are result of conscious choice and therefore reason-
able ones may be enforced); Foster and Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976) (covenant is enforceable so long as not "harsh or oppressive"). 
61. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment d (1979); Blake, supra note 4, 
at 674. E.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 353 N.E.2d 590, 592-
93,386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1976). 
62. See Blake, supra note 4, at 629-46 (discussing early English cases). 
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. The "rule of reason" inquiry developed in antitrust cases when courts 
were confronted by a statute that, on its face, declared void all agreements which restrained trade. 
Because every business contract is, to some extent, a restraint of trade, the efficient working ofthe 
economy demanded that business agreements which only arguably or incidentally restrained trade 
be found valid. Interpreting the Sherman Act to proscribe only unreasonable restraints wasjusti-
tied by the fear that if the Act were applied literally it would negate all business contracts. In 
contrast to antitrust restraints, there is no need to salvage a core group of covenants not to com-
pete. Therefore, despite its merit in the antitrust setting, a reasonableness inquiry does not seem 
appropriate to evaluate a covenant's validity. 
64. See, e.g., Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 365 Mass. 280, 289, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 
(1974) (restriction on practicing trade within 100 miles of former employer valid since employee 
worked that area); Harwell Enters., Inc. v. Heim, 276 N.C. 475, 478-81, 173 S.E.2d 316, 318-20 
(1970) (restrictive covenant barring competition in the entire United States reasonable when em-
ployer engaged in nationwide activities); Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 516, 
366 A.2d 902, 908 (1976) (covenant including ''the employer's total trade territory" too broad 
where employee only worked a portion of such territory). 
65. See, e.g., Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 752-53, 489 S.W.2d I, 3 
(1973) (three-year restraint exceeded useful life of trade secret information); Beckman v. Cox 
Broadcasting Corp., 250 Ga. 127, 130,296 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1982) (covenant prohibiting television 
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agent activity subject to restraint.66 The reasonableness of any particu-
lar restraint is theoretically tempered by the nature and extent of the 
principal's protectable interests.67 Courts may also invalidate restric-
tions on public policy grounds.68 Courts implicitly acknowledge the 
subjectivity inherent in this inquiry by disavowing precedent and not-
ing that each case must be evaluated in light of its own unique factual 
circumstances.69 
If the court finds the restriction imposed by the covenant reason-
able, it will enforce the covenant.70 But if the court finds the covenant 
unreasonable in whole or in part, the enforcement issue becomes more 
uncertain. Some courts hold umeasonableness in anyone of the rele-
vant areas of inquiry-time, space, or activity-renders the entire cove-
nant invalid and unenforceable.71 Other courts employ a ''blue pencil" 
personality from appearing on the air for six months reasonable); John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling 
Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 13,369 A.2d 1164, 1170 (1977) (three-year restrictive covenant 
reasonable when that duration of time needed to strengthen and reaffirm business contacts). 
66. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1981) (covenant 
barring agent from soliciting principal's customers valid); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 50-
51,268 N.E.2d 751, 754, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1,5-6 (1971) (covenant bauning oral surgeon from working 
in dentistry or oral surgery too broad); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (W. Va. 1979) 
(covenant bauning employee from engaging in any competitive business unduly oppressive). 
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment d (1979) (unreasonable-
ness is that which goes beyond what is necessary to protect promisee's legitimate interests). 
68. See, e.g., Josten's Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295,299 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (disparity in size 
and market power is a public policy factor to be taken into consideration when determining valid-
ity of restrictive covenant); Dwyer v. Jung, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 136,348 A.2d 208, 208 (App. Div. 
1975) (voiding covenant in law partnership agreement as against public policy); if. Gelder Medi-
cal Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 685, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (1977) 
(considering, but rejecting on the facts, shortage of doctors as policy ground to refuse to enforce 
restrictive covenant); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment h, illustration 14 
(1979) (shortage of doctors in particular area covered by covenant should void some covenants on 
public policy grounds). Some commentators believe that public policy is not actually a factor in 
the reasonableness analysis despite courts' statements to the contrary. See Handler & Lazaroff, 
supra note 5, at 720 (public injury should not be distinct element of proof in covenant cases). 
69. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feuner & Smith, Inc. v. Stidham, 658 F.2d 1098, llOl 
(5th Cir. 1981) (because authorities on restrictive covenants are "at war," the standard ofreasona-
bleness has "been rendered hollow and meaningless"); see also Hutter, supra note 2, at 328-29 
(this area of law is a "mass of factually distinct and irreconcilable decisions"). 
70. See Blake, supra note 4, at 648-49 (reasonable restraints valid); Handler & Lazaroff, 
supra note 5, at 758-63 (if the geographic and temporal scope of restraint bears a direct relation-
ship to the protection needed, covenant is valid). 
71. See, e.g., Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753-56, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 
(1973) (refusing to grant partial injunctive relief when only the temporal element of a restrictive 
covenant was offensive); Purcell v. Joyner, 231 Ga. 85, 86-87,200 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1973) (declining 
to apply "theory of severability" to invalidate unreasonable aspects of otherwise reasonable cove-
nant); Note, Employee Covenants Not to Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 105, 135-37 (1980) (minority of courts will declare entire covenant void if portions thereof 
are unreasonable). 
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rule, invalidating the unreasonable portions of the covenant while en-
forcing other parts of the agreement that are grammatically separable 
from the offending portions.72 Finally, some courts rewrite the offend-
ing covenant to the extent deemed reasonable under the circum-
stances.73 These courts then enforce the "rewritten" restraint against 
the former agent. Courts in this third group will not rewrite the re-
straint if the principal negotiated or imposed the restriction in bad 
faith.74 In summary, courts vary widely in their approaches to enforc-
ing covenants not to compete. 
B. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT ApPROACH 
The modem analysis of covenants not to compete is unsatisfactory 
in its conception and inconsistent in its application. The extent of the 
principal's protectable interest should be the most significant inquiry in 
judicial evaluation of a covenant not to compete. Unfortunately, courts 
fail to adequately scrutinize or define the protectable interest of the 
principal in analyzing such covenants. Although trade secrets and con-
fidential infonnation are properly included within the scope of the 
principal's protectable interests, an agent's exposure to customers or 
possession of unique skills is not. The agent's attributes are therefore 
irrelevant in determining the scope of protectable infonnation. 
An agent's relationship with customers is a function of individual 
personality and particular market skills unless the infonnation at the 
core of the relationship qualifies as a trade secret or confidential infor-
72. One court described the blue pencil rule as follows: 
There is a line of authority which states that if the territory specified in the contract 
is by the phraseology of the contract so described as to be divisible, the contract is sepa-
rable and may be enforced as to such portions of the territory so described as are reason-
able. This is the so-called "blue-pencil rule" and applies only to cases where the contract 
in terms specifies several distinct areas, so that erasing the description of one or more of 
those areas leaves the description of an area for which the restriction is reasonable. 
Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, 184,277 A.2d 512, 514 (Super. Ct. 1971). The 
blue pencil rule, endorsed by the Restatement of Contracts § 518, has been disavowed by the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts as "contrary to the weight of authority." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 Reporter's Note (1979). 
73. E.g., Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 585, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (1970); Raimonde v. 
Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 25-26, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1975); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 
Pa. 586, 596-99, 351 A.2d 250, 254-57 (1976). 
74. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 363 (1982). The purpose of the good faith re-
quirement is to discourage principals from drafting overbroad covenants for thcir in tcrrorem 
effect on agents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 comment a (1979) (a party 
who engaged in serious misconduct cannot take advantage of partial enforcement rule). Some 
courts presume, however, that a principal is acting in good faith. E.g., Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 
42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 25, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1975). For a criticism of this presumption, see MIL-
GRIM, supra note 2, § 3.02[2], at 3-76 to -79. 
1984] INVOLUNTARY NONSERVITUDE 545 
mation?5 Similarly, an agent's heightened level of expertise or compe-
tence is a skill belonging to the agent if it is not attributable to trade 
secrets or confidential information.76 Including either quality within 
the ambit of a protectable interest insulates the principal from a former 
agent's legitimate competition.77 Those decisions stating that the mere 
75. The concept of confidential information appears to encompass the situation involving 
contacts between customers and agents where, by virtue of the fungible nature of the product 
involved and the frequency and regularity of the contacts between the customer and the agent, the 
customer perceives the agent as being the principal or ''the business." This situation occurs most 
commonly in the route salesman context. The customer contacts here are essential to the eco-
nomic efficiency of the principal-agent relationship. See supra note 34. The principal's protectable 
interest here is simply the right to inform customers that the principal remains a source for the 
product previously provided by the agent. The restraint should therefore be limited to the period 
the principal needs to introduce the new agent to the customers. See i'!fra note 94; see also MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 445.766 (West 1967) (allowing exception to general invalidity of noncompeti-
tion covenants and providing for enforcement of covenants in the "route salesman" context for a 
90 day period following termination of the contract or services); Developments in the Law, Compet-
itive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 956-57 (1964): 
Because [in the route driver context] the customers' only contact with the employer nor-
mally is through the driver and the product usually is similar to that of competitors, 
customers may often follow the deliveryman when he leaves. It is this customer contact, 
not any secretness of the list, that is important, so these cases do not really fall within the 
trade secret category. . . . Where product differentiation is minimal, the case for pre-
venting solicitation of former customers for a limited period of time is strong, while 
customers will not have products delivered by persons known to them, they are still free 
to choose among suppliers on the basis of their products. And though the deliveryman 
will lose the advantage of customer contact, in most cases the work of others initially 
induced the customer to buy the product, and the deliveryman's personal contact is a 
byproduct of his primary job. The most appropriate remedy would be a temporary in-
junction forbidding him from soliciting former customers until his former employer's 
new deliveryman has had an opportunity to become acquainted with the customers. 
Id. The imposition of the restraint is properly based on the principal's protectable interest rather 
than the existence or nonexistence of a contract. See Blake, supra note 4, at 653-67 (discussing 
extra protection afforded principal in area of customer relationships). 
76. See 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 1, at 97-100 (exceptional skill of employee should have no 
bearing on question of restraint's illegality); C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § l391B 
(Supp. 1982) (analogizing that "Princeton could not have enjoined Albert Einstein from leaving to 
take a position at Harvard just because he was famous and his scientific writings enhanced 
Princeton's reputation"). Furthermore, a restraint can never be properly justified by the agent's 
job proficiency. An oceupational ban in a covenant does not make the principal whole, it merely 
punishes the agent for being indispensible. This rationale cannot therefore justify a postassocia-
tional restraint. E.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1982); Hallmark Personnel of 
Texas v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 
Mass. 223, 226-28, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (1928); see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 640 ("the very 
'specialness' of the employee mandates that he be free to compete"). 
77. E.g., Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 33, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971); Ellis v. 
Lionikis, 162 N.J. Super. 579, 585, 394 A.2d 116, 119 (App. Div. 1978); see also Blake, supra note 
4, at 64647 (goal of restraint "is not to prevent the competitive use of the unique personal quali-
ties of the employee ... but to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships 
which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the 
employment"). 
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existence of the agreement constitutes a sufficient protectable interest1s 
highlight the faulty analysis produced by the strict application of con-
tract rules to covenant litigation. Thus, the courts misconceive the 
principal's protectable interest by deriving the scope of the restraint 
from contract law rather than the more appropriate limitation defined 
by agency law. 
The rules of contract law also mandate application of a reasona-
bleness analysis that has produced confusion and inconsistency in 
modem judicial treatment of covenants not to compete. The concept of 
a reasonable restraint varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and fre-
quently even within a particular jurisdiction.79 The courts' struggle to 
balance the variety of factors involved has produced a series of rules 
with no precedential value. This confusion and inconsistency may en-
courage many restrictive covenants to go unchallenged as an agent may 
abide by the covenant's terms rather than face litigation costs and the 
uncertainty of judicial action.so An unchallenged covenant also limits 
an agent's mobility by inhibiting other principals from employing the 
agent.SI 
Aside from the obvious statement that courts are more likely to 
uphold covenants with narrower geographic restraints, shorter time pe-
riods, or more limited activity restrictions, the cases provide little gui-
dance. In applying the reasonableness test, courts do appear to 
concentrate more upon time and space restrictions than activity re-
straints. S2 Thus, courts are likely to enforce a "reasonable" one year 
restraint in a small geographic area even if it incorporates an occupa-
tional ban. This result fails to consider the critical issue in restraint 
cases-the relationship of the principal's protectable interest, properly 
defined, to the activity restriction imposed upon the agent. 
78. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
79. See Hutter, supra note 1, at 328-29 (test of reasonableness suffers from a mass of factu-
ally distinct and irreconcilable decisions). 
80. q: Sullivan, supra note 3, at 622-23 (employees avoid litigation "by moving beyond the 
ambit of the restrictive covenant" or by never leaving their employment). As one commentator 
observes, "While taking each case on its merits is an appealing approach, it is an approach which 
tends to place litigation expense burdens on defendants (former employees) who as a class are 
frequently not in an economic position to test their rights." MILGRlM, supra note 2, § 3.02[2J,at 3-
81 (footnote omitted). 
81. Violating the covenant not to compete could subject ~ I;Ompeting principal to tort liabil-
ity for intentional interference with the performance of a contracr. E.g., Gorman Publishing Co. 
v. Stillman, 516 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 
(1977) (detailing liability of third party who intentionally interferes with performance of a 
contract). 
82. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. 
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Even if the results produced were consistent and clear, the nature 
of current reasonableness analysis encourages courts to ignore the truly 
relevant issue in any restraint case: the definition of the employer's 
protectable interest. By focusing on whether one year is too long, 
courts have actually become receptive to imposing an occupational ban 
on an employee for some period. Despite caveats that covenants not to 
compete are disfavored restraints of trade and inherently suspect,83 in 
many cases the current judicial treatment of such covenants therefore 
actually results in enforcing occupational restrictions.84 Instead of fo-
cusing on the concept of reasonableness, courts should focus on pro-
tecting the secret or confidential information obtained by the agent 
from the principal. Courts should limit any restraint imposed, espe-
cially an activity restriction, to the minimum extent necessary to safe-
guard the protectable information. 
The "blue pencil rule" and the "rewriting" of offending covenants 
illustrate another defect in the reasonableness approach. These prac-
tices encourage employers to be "unreasonable" in drafting covenants 
not to compete because there is, in effect, no sanction for being unrea-
sonable. An unchallenged, overbroad covenant will chill an agent 
from legitimately competing with the principal. If the agent does chal-
lenge the covenant and a court finds the restriction unreasonable, the 
court may still prohibit the agent from competing to the extent the 
court considers reasonable, if the principal acted in good faith.85 If 
courts are receptive to enforcing at least some type of restraint, the 
number and scope of restrictive covenants will increase. 
III. THE PROPOSAL: A UNIFORM AGENCY ANALYSIS 
Courts closely scrutinize and strictly construe postassociational re-
straints in both contractual and noncontractual cases because these re-
strictions are judicially suspect restraints of trade. The restraints 
imposed must be no more restrictive than is justified by the nature of 
the principal's protectable interest in any particular case.86 The princi-
pal's trade secrets and confidential information are the proper protect-
able interests in both contract and noncontract cases.87 In the absence 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
84. See, e.g., Annot., 43 A.L.R.20 94, 213-21 (1955) (compiling cases considering reasona-
bleness of restraint's duration); 45 A.L.R.20 77 (1952) (collecting cases on how enforceability of 
covenants is affected by duration of restriction). 
85. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40, 46-48, 67. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 75-78. See also MILGRlM, supra note 2, 
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of a contract, an agent's fiduciary duty provides a basis for a postas-
sociational restraint sufficient to safeguard these defined interests.88 
The question arises, in light of these premises, as to why the terms 
of a covenant not to compete should provide the basis for imposing any 
restriction on the postassociational activities of the former agent. That 
is, why should an agreement between principal and agent enhance the 
protection against unfair competition and misuse of protectable infor-
mation already provided by the fiduciary duties imposed by agency 
principles? The appropriate response is that, in most cases, it should 
not. 
Using contract rules to evaluate a covenant's validity permits 
courts to enforce occupational bans that give more protection from 
competition to a principal's interests than is legitimately justified.89 
This result directly contradicts the principle, acknowledged in the cove-
nant cases themselves, that the principal's protectable interests should 
limit the extent of any postassociational restraint.90 In applying con-
tract doctrines, courts fail to perceive that a restriction tailored to pre-
vent misuse of protected information sufficiently safeguards the 
principal's interests without unnecessarily and unfairly banning the 
agent from a chosen occupation. If the restriction is coextensive with 
the principal's protectable interests, the covenant adds nothing to the 
protection provided by the agent's common law fiduciary duty. The 
contractual covenant is therefore superfluous. If the covenant is 
broader than the protectable interest, it is merely the principal's at-
tempt to overextend rights-an attempt perhaps made possible by the 
principal's disproportionate bargaining power in the preemployment 
context.91 A court should therefore subordinate the rules of contract 
law to agency concepts when analyzing postassociational restraints.92 
§ 3.02[1][dJ, at 3-13 to -18 ("good authority can be urged that restrictive covenants should not be 
used to prohibit ordinary services not involving any element of secrecy of the employer'S 
business"). 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43. 
89. Courts overprotect a principal's interests any time they enforce a covenant's occupational 
ban when a more narrowly drawn restriction (against, for example, solicitation of the principal's 
customers, or disclosure of confidential information) would fully protect the principal's legitimate 
interests. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 86. See also Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 
298 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn. 1980) ("[T]he fact that an employee has during the course of his 
employmeut acquired nonconfidential information and skills that are not secret processes cannot 
support the enforcement of a restrictive covenant"). 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
92. In addition to or in lieu of covenants not to compete, a principal and an agent may 
contract not to disclose trade secrets or confidential information. Hutter, supra note I, at 315-16. 
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In all cases determining the validity of a postassociational re-
straint, the initial inquiry should be whether, during the course of the 
employment, the former agent obtained trade secrets or confidential 
information belonging to the principal. If not, the principal has no pro-
tectable interest, the agent's posttermination competition is authorized 
by agency principles, and the court should deny relief and dismiss the 
action. If the agent had access to protect able information of the princi-
pal, the court must then determine whether the agent's subsequent ac-
tivity has constituted or would constitute misuse of the information. 
Misuse which has already occurred renders the former agent liable 
for damages to the principal;93 misuse which is threatened can be en-
joined. When granting equitable relief, the court should analyze 
whether a restriction on the particular agent permits continued compe-
tition with the former principal but prohibits unfair competition. For 
example, if a customer list is a trade secret and is therefore within the 
principal's protectable interest, the court should prevent misuse of the 
information by enjoining the former agent from soliciting those cus-
tomers for an appropriate period.94 However, a principal's interest in a 
customer list does not justify banning the agent from the occupation 
itself.95 The agent should be able to compete on the next block on the 
next day if the agent is not misusing the protected information by solic-
iting customers from the list. Courts should disfavor occupational bans 
and only enforce them in the rare instances allowed under agency and 
Nondisclosure agreements should also be treated as superfluous because the interest being pro-
tected-nondisclosure of protected information-is fully safeguarded by agency and unfair com-
petition precepts. A principal could require an agent to acknowledge in writing that certain 
information was confidential or secret and such a writing could be a factor in a subsequent judi-
cial inquiry regarding the protectability of the information at issue. However, such an acknowl-
edgement should not extend the scope of a principal's protectable interest or influence the 
propriety of any remedy. Blake, supra note 4, at 671. 
93. In many cases, damages caused by misuse of information will be speculative and hard to 
prove. Considering the disfavored status of the covenant and its disproportionate impact on em-
ployees with little or no real bargaining strength, the principal seeking enforcement of a covenant 
clearly should have the burden of proving harm. 
94. The appropriate period for an injunction may depend on the nature of the business' 
product or service. See ])evelopments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 957 
(1964) (when product differentiation is minimal, "[t]he most appropriate remedy would be a tem-
porary injunction forbidding [the former employee] from soliciting former customers until his 
former employer's new [employee] has had an opportunity to become acquainted with the custom-
ers"); see also Blake, supra note 4, at 663-67 (discussing employer's remedies that ensure retention 
of its customers). 
95. See generally 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 1, at 105-06 (injunction can "prevent the disclo-
sure of secrets or the solicitation of old customers without requiring the employee to refrain whol-
ly from renewing employment in the same vicinity"). 
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unfair competition principles.96 
A court is justified in applying contract rules only in the rare in-
stance where, at the time of contracting, the agent possesses bargaining 
power equal to that of the principal. This equality is likely to exist 
when an agent negotiates a personal services contract or an agent with 
acknowledged expertise and reputation within an industry fills a signif-
icant position within the principal's business.97 In these situations the 
court can justifiably conclude that the principal "purchased" the cove-
nant not to compete. One can evaluate whether the agent possessed 
sufficient bargaining power by examining analogous inquiries of bar-
gaining strength in other contractual contexts.98 Any doubts regarding 
the equality of bargaining power should be resolved against the em-
ployer due to the infrequency of its occurrence and the legal system's 
disfavor for restraints on trade.99 This analysis of bargaining power 
appears to be much more germane to the enforcement of a contractual 
restraint than the ill-defined concept of the unique employee. IOO If a 
court disallows the covenant because of the agent's lack of bargaining 
power, the principal should still be entitled to invoke the agent's fiduci-
ary duty to protect appropriate information. 
Treating the covenant as a nullity effectively harmonizes judicial 
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
97. See Blake, supra note 4, at 661 (employee possessing high degree of skill more likely 
than not able to bargain for appropriate restraint); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against 
Wrongful.Discharge: The .Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1844 
(1980) (at will employees with unspecialized skills bear full risk of wrongful termination because 
of lack of bargaining power). One reason for the less exacting judicial scrutiny of covenants in the 
sale of businesses is the increased likelihood that such covenants are the product of bona fide 
negotiation. See 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1643 (3d ed. 1972) 
(courts more likely to uphold agreement to refrain from competition in contract of sale than in 
contracts of employment); Blake, supra note 4, at 646-47 (goodwill sale obligates seller to deliver 
thing sold by refraining from competition). 
98. See, e.g., Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a M atur· 
ing Sports Industry, 24 B.C.L. REv. 341, 375-77 (1983) (adequate union participation in structur-
ing of final management proposal means there has been significant modification of management 
proposal or receipt of a specific significant quid pro quo for including a term). One strong indica-
tor of bargaining strength would be a provision for the agent to receive the same salary during the 
effective term of the contractual restriction. Enforcement of an occupational ban seems less intru-
sive on the agent's rights if the agent receives a salary for the proscribed period. See, e.g., Modern 
Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1978) (employee guaranteed salary 
during restricted period after discharge if comparable work could not be found because of cove-
nant). Such a payment would also indicate that the principal had purchased the occupational ban 
in a good faith negotiation. The imposition of an occupational ban in the noncontractual context 
can be conditioned on such a payment. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 59, 76 and accompanying text. 
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treatment of restraints in both contractual and noncontractual cases. 
Agency concepts protect the principal's legitimate interests by prevent-
ing agents from engaging in activities that violate their fiduciary duty. 
By focusing on limiting the use of the principal's protected interest-
the information-rather than the "reasonableness" of time, space, and 
activity limitations, agents will be able to continue their careers, subject 
to specific limitations, and compete with former principals, rather than 
having to seek employment outside their fields of training. 
A number of courts have justified the current receptivity to en-
forcement of occupational bans by stating that restricting the use of the 
protected information is the effective equivalent of an occupational ban 
because it so reduces the agent's marketability. 101 This criticism fails to 
consider that free market forces are the proper means of determining 
whether the former agent, limited to personal talents and restricted 
from misuse of the principal's protected information, remains saleable 
and effective in the market. The principal can police compliance with 
any injunction to ensure that no misuse of the protected information 
accounts for the agent's marketability if the agent remains saleable. 102 
In addition, in ordering an occupational ban, courts are frequently try-
ing to avoid the arguably difficult legal issues presented by questions of 
what constitutes a trade secret or confidential information.103 This in-
quiry, however, call1iot legitimately be circumvented. If a piece of in-
formation is neither a trade secret nor confidential in nature, it is not an 
asset of the principal but rather a legitimate part of the agent's person-
ality and market skills. Therefore, only trade secrets or confidential 
information constitute a protectable interest sufficient to justify any 
form of postassociational restraint. A court can adequately balance the 
legitimate interests of the principal, the agent, and the public only by 
focusing on the principal's actual protectable interests and restricting 
the former agent's particular activities only to the extent necessary to 
prevent misuse of the information. 
101. See, e.g., All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 781 n.3, 308 N.E.2d 481, 487 n.3 
(1974) (new employer "would not be likely to retain [the employee] to work in an area in which all 
or a portion of the potential customers could not be solicited by him"). 
102. q: Hutter, supra note 1, at 315 (employer may obtain injunction against disclosure 
before actual disclosure by showing that disclosure is imminent or inevitable). 
103. E.g., MILGRlM, supra note 2, § 3.02[1J[d], at 3-13 (noting, without explanation, that 
"[w]hile use and disclosure of a former employer's trade secrets by an ex-employee is clearly 
prohibited as a matter of law, ... such ex-employee's taking competitive employment which 
would increase the likelihood of wrongful use or disclosure migpt not be enjoined absent a valid 
covenant not to compete"). 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL 
Adopting the system of analysis proposed in this Article would 
change both the legal reasoning of and the results achieved by courts in 
restrictive covenant cases. This change is best illustrated by applying 
the thesis of this Article to some of the illustrations to section 188 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and to a number of recent cases. 
This examination demonstrates that focusing on protection of the prin-
cipal's information and ignoring the contract's generally adhesive terms 
provides the principal adequate protection while avoiding unnecessary 
and inefficient restrictions on the former agent's right to compete. 
Illustration six of section 188 describes a covenant restricting a 
contact lens fitter from similar employment in the same town for three 
years following termination of the employment relationship.104 The 
Restatement concludes that the three year occupational ban is enforce-
able because the employee had close relationships with the employer's 
customers. lOS The employer's protectable interest does not justify this 
result. The court's initial inquiry should be whether the agent's rela-
tionship with the customers involves the employee's use of information 
belonging to the employer. If the customer relations are not the prop-
erty of the employer because the information at the heart of the rela-
tion was neither a trade secret nor confidential, no postassociational 
restraint on the employee's activity is justified because the employer is 
not entitled to protection from competition. If the customer relations 
are the property of the employer, the employee, on the facts, should 
still not be banned from pursuing his occupation for three years. The 
lens fitter should be able to open his practice in the same town the next 
day subject to an injunction preventing misuse of the employer's infor-
mation. In this case, a court should enjoin the fitter from soliciting his 
former employer's customers for a reasonable period of tnne. 106 The 
result obtained from the analysis proposed by this Article comports 
104. The full text of illustration 6 is as follows: 
A employs B as a fitter of contact lenses under a one-year employment contract. As 
part of the employment agreement, B promises not to work as a fitter of contact lenses in 
the same town for three years after the termination of his employment. B works for A 
for five years, during which he has close relationships with A's customers, who come to 
rely upon him. B's contacts with A's customers are such as to attract them away from A. 
B's promise is not unreasonably in restraint of trade and enforcement is not precludcd on 
grounds of public policy. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g, illustration 6 (1979). 
105. Id. 
106. The injunction should last until the benefits of the information expire. In solicitation of 
customer cases, the time period of the injunction ends when the principal can hire a new agent and 
the new agent has time to become acquainted with the customers. See Blake, supra note 4, at 659 
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with the principle enunciated, but frequently ignored, by the courts that 
any restriction on the fonner employee's activities should be drawn as 
narrowly as possible while still protecting the principal's interest. 
Moreover, a narrow restriction prohibiting misuse of the principal's in-
fonnation would permit the principal's customers to patronize the lens 
fitter of their choice, so long as these customers are not solicited by the 
fonner agent. 107 The principal can police the injunction by demonstrat-
ing, as an evidentiary matter, that lost customers now buying from the 
fonner agent had, in fact, been solicited by the agent during the pro-
scribed period. Since the extent of the justifiable restraint is limited by 
the employer's protectable interest,108 a court should consider this cove-
nant a nullity. 
Illustration eight describes a covenant restricting a dance instruc-
tor from similar employment in the same town for three years follow-
ing termination of the employment relationship even though he 
acquired no confidential infonnation in his direct dealings with cus-
tomers.109 Because the dance instructor did not obtain any trade 
secrets or confidential information during his employment, there is no 
sufficient protectable interest of the employer to justify any restraint. 
In this case, the Restatement and the analysis proposed in this Article 
would both conclude that the covenant is unenforceable and the in-
structor is free to compete with his former employer without being sub-
ject to any restrictions upon his activities. 
Illustration nine, however, again provides for the enforcement of a 
complete occupational ban for three years following termination of an 
(frequency of agent's contact with ex-employer's customers determines length of postemployment 
restriction); see also supra note 94. 
107. If customers leave the principal upon learning of the agent's departure, their acts of 
bringing business to the agent's new employment would not necessarily be actionable. The princi-
pal's infonnation must be misused by the agent in order for liability to attach. If the agent does 
not use the information in some fonn of solicitation, the departure of the customers results from 
the market's response to competition and not misuse of infonnation. See supra note 14. 
108. The lens fitter could be enjoined from engaging in the field if the court were convinced 
that the principal's customers were the only contact lens customers in the area. This situation 
would appear to be rare. If applicable, the occupational ban should still contain a time limit. See 
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
109. The full text of illustration 8 is as follows: 
A employs B as an instructor in his dance studio. As part of the employment agree-
ment, B promises not to work as a dance instructor in the same town for three years after 
the termination of his employment. B works for five years and deals directly with cus-
tomers but does not work with any customer for a substantial period of time and ac-
quires no confidential infonnation in his work. B's promise is unreasonably in restraint 
of trade and is uncnforceable on grounds of public policy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g, illustration 8 (1979). 
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employment relationship.110 If a court concludes that the chemist ob-
tained confidential information during his employment, the pharma-
ceutical company is entitled to a restraint preventing only the misuse of 
the information. The chemist should therefore be allowed to compete 
in the same industry without using the protected information. The 
pharmaceutical industry will decide if the chemist is marketable with-
out the protected information. If the chemist used the banned informa-
tion in the subsequent employment, the former company could sue for 
damages. III If the company could prove that disclosure of the infor-
mation was inextricably entwined with the job, the court could order an 
occupational ban for the shortest useful life of the information. 112 All 
of these results can be achieved pursuant to the fiduciary duties of 
agency law. Once again the covenant not to compete should be treated 
as a nullity, in contrast to the views of the Restatement. 
The same analysis applies to covenants involving professionals 
and partners, but the increased likelihood that these parties have equal 
bargaining power increases the probability that a court will enforce the 
covenant. 113 Illustration eleven of the Restatement would have a court 
110. The full text of illustration 9 is as follows: 
A employs B as a research chemist in his nationwide pharmaceutical business. As 
part of the employment agreement, B promises not to work in the pharmaceutical indus-
try at any place in the country for three years after the termination of his employment. B 
works for five years and acquires valuable confidential information that would be useful 
to A's competitors and would unreasonably harm A's business. B can find employment 
as a research chemist outside of the pharmaceutical industry. B's promise is not unrea-
sonably in restraint of trade and enforcement is not precluded on the grounds of public 
policy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g, illustration 9 (1979). 
Ill. A would be allowed to prove damages. He would know of the development of his prod-
uct by a competitor. He would then subjectively prove B's disclosure or, in partial proof of disclo-
sure, objectively prove that the competitor could not have independently developed the product 
within that time period. If A cannot prove the latter, the information was probably not a trade 
secret or confidential. Moreover, using a contract analysis does not significantly reduce the diffi-
culty of proving damages. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100. The appropriateness of enforcing a restric-
tive covenant on competition according to its terms, rather than limiting it to proteetion of the 
principal's protectable information, appears to be a particular application of the black letter con-
tract rule that courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration once consideration is 
found to be present. This rule in tum grew out of the modem notion of consideration as bargain 
and exchange. The presence of apparently fair and roughly equal bargaining positions of the 
parties leads to the assumption that the parties' agreement on the exchange removes any need for 
jUdicial scrutiny into adequacy. In the context of an agreement between principal and agent on 
postemployment competitive restrictions, the terms of the agreement should be enforced as a mat-
ter of contract law if the bargaining process has been carefully scrutinized and the covenant is the 
result of actual bargaining and not adhesion. The existence of such bargaining assures that the 
exchange has been meaningful and the principal has purchased the restriction. For a general 
discussion of consideration, see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 41-42 (1982). Farnsworth 
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enforce a three-year ban on the practice of veterinary medicine in the 
town in which the partnership practice was located. 114 The initial in-
quiry in such cases should be whether the three veterinarians had 
roughly similar bargaining power. If so, a court should enforce the 
three year ban as a valid contract tenn suitably purchased by the other 
parties. If not, a court should treat the covenant as a nullity and ex-
amine whether the retiring veterinarian obtained any infonnational as-
sets of the partnership or the other parties. If he has not, the 
veterinarian should be free to compete without any restrictions on his 
activities. If he has, he should be able to compete subject to his not 
employing the infonnation belonging to the partnership or his fonner 
partners. The continuing business is only entitled to protection from 
the misuse of its infonnation, not from competition itself. 
Illustrations twelve and thirteen reinforce the same principles. In 
illustration twelve, the Restatement would not have a court enforce an 
occupational ban involving an experienced dentist and a younger 
one. 115 This covenant, unlike covenants negotiated by comparably ex-
perienced professionals as in illustration eleven, is not likely to be the 
product of equal bargaining power and, on this ground, should rarely 
be enforced. Absent some special bargaining circumstance, a court 
should treat the covenant as a nullity and restrain the younger doctor 
only from using infonnation proven to be the older doctor's prop-
erty.116 Likewise, illustration thirteen would not have a court enforce a 
notcs the evolution of the consideration doctrine as leading the courts' concerns away from the 
substance of the exchange. "Their sole inquiry now was into the process by which the parties had 
arrived at 1hat exchange-was it the product of a 'bargain'? ... Under the bargain theory a 
promise that had been exchanged as a result of that process satisfied the fundamental test of 
enforceability without more." Id. § 2.2, at 42. 
114. The full text of illustration 11 is as follows: 
A, Band C form a partnership to practice veterinary medicine in a town for ten 
years. In the partnership agreement, each promises that if, on the termination of the 
partnership, the practice is continued by the other two members, he will not practice 
veterinary medicme in the same town during its continuance up to a maximum of three 
years. The restraint is not more extensive than is necessary for the protec1ion of each 
partner's interest in the partnership. Their promises are not unreasonably in restraint of 
trade and enforcement is not precluded on grouuds of public policy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment h, illustration 11 (1979). 
115. The full text of illustration 12 is as follows: 
A, an experienced dentist and oral surgeon, takes into partnership B, a younger 
dentist and oral surgeon. In the partnership agreement, B promises that, if he withdraws 
from the partnership, he will not practice dentistry or oral surgery in the city for three 
years. Their practice is limited to oral surgery, and does not include dentistry. The 
activity proscribed is more extensive than is necessary for A's protection. B's promise is 
unreasonably in restraint of trade and is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment h, illustration 12 (1979). 
116. The Restatement refers to the possibility of enforcement of the "reasouable" portion of 
the restraint. Id. A "reasonableness" analysis encourages principals to draft overbroad covenants 
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restraint on a former partner in a nationwide accounting firm which 
would prevent him from practicing in any city where the former em-
ployer had an office.ll7 In these situations, bargaining power charac-
teristically favors the large firm. Therefore, the applicable restrictions 
should be limited to those sanctioned by fiduciary duty and the em-
ployer's protectable interests. 
Because of the strictures of the contract law analysis, even those 
cases which focus intelligently on a principal's protectable interests fail 
to appreciate that such interests provide the basis for restraining the 
agent's posttermination activity.1ls As a result, these cases almost al-
ways impose occupational bans on the agent exceeding the protection 
to which the principal is legitimately entitled. For example, the court 
in Gorman Publishing Co. v. Stillman 119 considered a restrictive cove-
nant in an employment contract which, by its terms, barred the agent 
for two years after the termination of his employment from engaging 
"in a business directly competitive with [the] Company anywhere in the 
United States or the foreign areas where the Company has done busi-
ness or has planned or scheduled business."12o In assessing the validity 
of this covenant, the court accurately observed that such a covenant "is 
not enforceable unless the employer can demonstrate that a 'protectible 
interest' justifies it."121 The court then carefully scrutinized the nature 
of the principal's business and the agent's specific activities and respon-
sibilities. The court concluded that, based on the agent's extensive 
knowledge of the principal's advertisers, "the covenant not to compete 
was reasonably drawn to protect a legitimate interest and was enforcea-
ble."I22 Thus, the defendant was barred from competitive employment 
for the two-year term of the covenant. 123 
and chills the mobility of agents by increasing the number of covenants. See supra text accompa-
nying note 85; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g. illustration 10 
(1979) (ten-year covenant not to compete too long for fields with rapid technological change). 
117. The full text of illustration 13 is as follows: 
A works for five years as a partner in a nationwide firm of accountants. In the 
partnership agreement, A promiSes not to engage in accounting in any city where the 
firm has an office for three years after his withdrawal from the partnership. The firm has 
offices in the twenty largest cities in the United States. A's promise imposes great hard-
ship on him because this area includes almost all that in which he could engage in a 
comparable accounting practice. The promise is unreasonably in restraint of trade and is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment h. illustration 13 (1979). 
118. See supra note 60. 
119. 516 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. ill. 1980). 
120. Id. at 101. 
121. Id. at 104. 
122. Id. at 106. 
123. Id. 
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Putting aside the question of whether the information at issue was 
sufficiently confidential to justify protection, the court-approved two-
year ban on competition was far broader than necessary to protect the 
principal's protectable interest in that information and also restricted 
the agent's activities far more than necessary. If, as the court found, the 
principal's right to protection from the competitive activity of the for-
mer agent rested in confidential information concerning the principal's 
advertisers,124 then an injunction against solicitation of those advertis-
ers by the agent would have provided the principal with all the protec-
tion the information warranted. The duration of the injunction should 
be limited to the time necessary for the principal to replace the agent 
with a new employee and to train the new employee to retain those 
advertisers for the publication. Enforcing the scope and duration of the 
occupational ban as specified in the contract is simply inappropriate in 
the absence of an inquiry into either the need for such a ban to protect 
the confidential information or the actual bargaining power of the par-
ties at the time of contracting. 125 Without a careful analysis of the prin-
cipal's interest, the covenant should not be designated as reasonable. 
The inappropriateness of applying contract law concepts to an 
analysis of covenants not to compete is further illustrated by Continen-
tal Group, Inc. v. Kinsley.126 At issue in Kinsley was the validity of a 
covenant by which the agent agreed not to "engage in any competitive 
enterprise" for a period of eighteen months following termination of 
his employment.127 Despite the court's finding that there was substan-
tial dispute over the existence of any confidential information and its 
subsequent use by the agent,128 the court enforced the occupational ban 
according to the agreement's terms. The court justified its conclusion 
by applying the contract notion that, because the employment relation-
ship had been conducted pursuant to a formal agreement, the contract 
must add something to the protection otherwise available to the princi-
pal through agency principles. 129 
124. Id. at 105-06. 
125. The court stated that Gorman was represented by counsel at the time of agreement, and 
indicated that the employment contract was negotiated in good faith between parties possessing 
similar bargaining strength. Id. at 101. The court, however, did not rely or elaborate upon these 
factors. 
126. 422 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976). 
127. Id. at 841 n.1. 
128. Id. at 844. 
129. The exact language of the court is as follows: 
Moreover, it is by no means clear, as TPT appears to contend, that the test for 
enforcing a non-competition covenant is the same as would apply in obtaining an injunc-
tion to bar disclosure of trade secrets in the absence of a non-competition covenant or 
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The error of this analysis is manifest. The conclusion is preceded 
by findings that both the nature of the information involved and its 
potential for abuse in the competitive employment undertaken by the 
agent were highly problematic. 130 In addition, this reasoning suggests 
that the benefits of the "interesting work" undertaken by the former 
agent were unrelated to any benefit obtained by the principal. On the 
contrary, the agent's skills, learning, and talents were used in the serv-
ice of the principal, who presumably "got what he paid for" from such 
an employee. To suggest that such tasks would not be undertaken un-
less the agent would agree to be thereafter barred from competition 
fails to analyze or appreciate the value of skilled employees to the busi-
ness enterprise or the realities of employer/employee bargaining 
power. It is possible, of course, that the employer's information was so 
inextricably interwoven with the agent's activities that only a complete 
ban on competitive employment for the useful life of that information's 
secrecy would serve to protect adequately the principal's legitimate in-
terest. But the court's failure to inquire into this issue or into the bar-
gaining power of the parties, and its reliance on the terms of the 
contract, served both to restrict unfairly the activities of a highly 
trained agent and to provide unwarranted freedom from competition 
for the principal. The court allowed this result despite its recognition 
that a noncompetition agreement "interferes to some extent with an 
individual's freedom to pursue his calling and with the mobility of tal-
ent within the economy."131 
Applying contract law rules in the case of an allegedly unique em-
even an injunction to enforce a covenant not to disclose trade secrets. The non-competi-
tion covenant adds something to the protection available to the employer beyond what 
he would expect from the normal incidents of the employer-employee relationship or 
from a secrecy agreement. ... While an injunction to bar competitive employment is a 
more drastic remedy than an injunction to bar disclosure of the former employer's 
secrets, in some circumstances it is an entirely appropriate remedy because of the con-
scious choices both the employer and employee made when the covenant was given. At 
that point the employer decided he would make the employee privy to confidential infor-
mation concerning the employer's product development; if the employee preferred not to 
give the covenant, the employer could have assigned him elsewhere within the company 
or terminated his employment. Similarly, the employee decided to accept the opportu-
nity to be involved in the employer's sensitive product development work and signed the 
covenant which he understood was a requirement of having that opportunity for work of 
an interesting nature. If he preferred not to be bound by the covenant, he could have 
declined the opportunity for the specialized work. While these considerations would not 
warrant enforcement of covenants in situations where doing so would be unreasonable, 
they do provide justification for enforcement of otherwise reasonable covenants to pro-
tect against disclosure of all confidential information concerning the employer's develop-
ment of a new product, including some confidential information that might not 
technically qualify as a trade secret. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
130. Id. at 843-44. 
13!. Id. at 843. 
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ployee also encourages decision by fiat rather than analysis. In Brad-
ford v. New York Times Co., 132 a knowledgeable, highly placed 
employee had signed an agreement with the Times providing, in part, 
that upon terminating his employment he would not engage in any 
business competing with the Times during any period in which he was 
receiving payments from the company's Incentive Compensation 
Plan.133 Thereafter, he joined high level management of a competing 
newspaper chain. When the Times sought to terminate his Incentive 
Compensation Plan payments, the employee sued for a determination 
that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable. He argued that en-
forcement could not be based on threatened disclosure of trade secrets 
or unfair solicitation of customers of the Times. 134 Nevertheless, refer-
ring to a New York Court of Appeals case which suggested that restric-
tive covenants were enforceable against employees whose "services are 
deemed 'special, unique or extraordinary,'" the Second Circuit court 
ordered enforcement of the contractual restriction. 135 The court rea-
soned that the employee's "duties should leave no real doubt that he, if 
anyone at the Times, was in the category special, unique or extraordi-
nary."136 Thus, in spite of a clear holding that no protect able informa-
tion of the Times was subject to misuse by the employee, the 
occupational ban contained in the covenant was enforced. 
This opinion plainly demonstrates that the traditional notion of 
employee uniqueness is misplaced in evaluating the appropriateness of 
enforcing a contractual restriction on competitive employment. Be-
cause courts frequently use the concept when a particular agent has 
been a successful employee, the uniqueness analysis completely ignores 
the crucial issue of whether the agent's competition with the principal 
implicates any protectable information of that principal. The contract 
in Bradford would have been properly enforced if the agent had pos-
sessed enough bargaining power at the time of the agreement to justify 
a conclusion that the Times had purchased the restraint pursuant to 
good faith bargaining. However, the Bradford court did not rely upon 
this reasoning. The current notion of the unique employee therefore 
appears to sanction imposing a disfavored restraint of trade based upon 
the expertise of an agent as demonstrated solely by the agent's status in 
the principal's hierarchy. If the law governing the propriety of postas-
132. 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974). 
133. Id. at 54. 
134. Id. at 58. 
135. Id. at 58-59. 
136. Id. 
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sociational restraints is to emerge from the swamp of inconsistency and 
lack of direction in which it is currently mired, such enforcement by 
unreasoned categorization must be abandoned. If a court is to uphold 
a competitive restriction on the basis of the employee's uniqueness 
rather than on the protectable nature of the information threatened 
with misuse, the focus in such relatively rare instances must be on the 
fairness of bargaining at the time the covenant was made. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts uniformly recognize covenants not to compete as contracts 
in restraint of trade and, as such, subject to judicial disfavor and close 
scrutiny. In spite of repeated assertions to this effect, courts routinely 
enforce covenants not to compete against agents in employment con-
tracts. This imposition of occupational bans impairs agents' ability to 
obtain rewarding employment and decreases economic efficiency and 
productivity. These negative effects result from applying rules of con-
tract law which, except in unusual and specific instances, are inappro-
priate and unnecessary. Principals are not entitled to insulation from 
competition by agents; rather, they are only entitled to protection from 
unfair competition arising out of the agent's misuse of information be-
longing to the principal. The principal's information is adequately 
safeguarded by applying the rules of agency and unfair competition. 
Imposing the unfair and inefficient restraints of contract law limits the 
mobility of agents and grants principals more protection than their in-
terests warrant. Except in the rare instance when agent and principal 
possess equal bargaining power, postassociational restraints should be 
the product of a careful evaluation of the information properly within 
the ambit of the principal's protectable interests and the degrce of re-
striction needed to prevent misuse of such information by the agent. 
